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ABSTRACT
While it is by now well known that the privatization of township- and village-run enterprises
(TVREs) has been rapidly and widely taking place in China, it is much less known whether and to
what extent privatization has improved resource allocation and productivity.  As a first step toward
the fuller understanding of the effect of privatization, this study undertakes case studies of garment
and casting enterprises in the Greater Yantgze River Region, where TVREs led miraculous
economic growth in the 1980s.  Our empirical results indicate that productivity was significantly
enhanced by the recent privatization with time lag of a few years.
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I.  Introduction 
Until the 1980s, China’s miraculous economic growth had been led by publicly owned 
township and village enterprises (TVEs), which may be more accurately termed township- 
and village-run enterprises or TVREs (Chen et al. 1992; Jefferson et al. 1996; Otsuka et al. 
1998).
1  In the 1990s, however, private sector has emerged to be a leading sector of the 
economy in China.    In the southeastern part of Jiangsu province, whose successful record 
of economic development based on TVREs in the 1980s was dubbed the “Sunan Model of 
Industrial Development,” the privatization of TVREs has been taking place in the late 
1990s.  Furthermore, the growth rate of Zhejiang province, which has depended 
consistently on the growth of private sectors since the beginning of the 1980s, outweighed 
most other provinces including Jiangsu in the 1990s (Zhang 1999).     
While it is by now well known that privatization has been rapidly and widely taking 
place in China, it is much less known whether and to what extent privatization has 
improved resource allocation and productivity.
2  The major issue to be addressed in this 
study is to assess the productivity effects of TVE privatization quantitatively.    If the recent 
privatization results in the improvement of production efficiency, a question immediately 
arises as to why it did not take place earlier.  Also it is interesting to ask why TVREs 
prospered in Jiangsu in the 1980s.  These issues are critically important in understanding 
                                                  
1  Note that township and village enterprises (TVEs) include both TVREs and private enterprises. 
2  An exceptional and pioneering study is Li et al. (1999).   2 
the growth performance of the Chinese economy in the 1990s and assessing its future 
growth potential for the early decades of the 21st century. 
As a first step toward the fuller understanding of the effects of TVE privatization on 
productivity, this study undertakes case studies of the garment and metal casting enterprises 
in the Great Yangtze River Region extending from the suburbs of Shanghai to the western 
border of Anhui province.  Common and important characteristics of TVREs in the 
suburbs of Shanghai and southern Jiangsu were identified to be their dependence on SOEs 
in technology, management, and marketing (Otsuka, Liu, and Murakami 1998).  Some 
TVREs used to be cooperative TVEs or “branch factory” of urban SOEs, in which 
managers were sent from SOEs and profits were shared between them in accordance with 
their investment shares (Fudan University Economic Research Center 1988).  Putting-out 
contracts were frequently made not only between SOEs and their branches but also 
between SOEs and independent TVREs.    Moreover, TVREs often purchased second-hand 
machines used by SOEs and employed retired SOE workers in order to acquire the 
technology and management know-how of SOEs (Murakami, Liu, and Otsuka 1994, 1996).   
It seems that township and village governments supported such transactions and 
cooperation through direct involvement in enterprise management.
3 
Our maintained hypothesis is that such cooperation between TVREs and SOEs was 
                                                  
3  This view is consistent with the justification of TVREs by Che and Qian (1998), who argue that the 
advantage of local government ownership lies in reduction of state predation.   3 
mutually beneficial, at least in the light industries during the 1980s.
4  TVREs faced 
largely unregulated management environments, but lacked technology, management 
know-how, and marketing capacity.  In contrast, the management of SOEs was tightly 
regulated, even though they had decent management, technology, and marketing 
knowledge.  In the 1990s, two major changes seem to have taken place, which have 
eroded the advantage of the TVRE-SOE cooperation.  First, TVREs have absorbed the 
production knowledge and capacity of SOEs, so that payoff to maintain cooperative 
relationship with SOEs has gradually declined (Liu and Otsuka 1998).  Second, free 
market system has developed, so that the direct government support for the inter-enterprise 
transactions, particularly face-to-face transactions between TVREs and SOEs in our 
context, tends to lose its significance (Li 1996; Hsiao et al. 1998; Jin and Qian 1998; Chen 
and Rozelle 1999).  Therefore, we hypothesize that privatization in the late 1990s has 
resulted in significant improvements in production efficiency by enhancing management 
incentives without sacrificing marketing efficiencies. 
The organization of this paper is as follows.    In the next section, sampling scheme is 
explained, and the basic statistics of our sample enterprises, such as the growth rate of 
valued added, are presented.    After examining the changing importance of subcontracting 
transactions with SOEs and the changing distribution of stock ownership by the local 
government vis-à-vis private owners in section III, we assess the impacts of privatization 
                                                  
4 Lin and Yao (2001) contend that the development of the SOE sector tended to help the development of   4 
on productivity by estimating the function that explains the growth rate of per worker 
value-added, separately for the garment and metal casting industries, in section IV.  
Implications of this study will be discussed in the final section.     
 
II.  Data 
     To analyze determinants and consequences of TVRE privatization, we use data 
collected by a rural enterprise survey conducted in 1999 and 2000 in the Great Yangtze 
River Region from the suburb of Shanghai to about 650 km points upstream.  The study 
areas include 5 counties in the suburb of Shanghai, 19 counties in the south of the Yangtze 
River in Jiangsu province, and 29 counties between the Yangtze and the Huai He Rivers in 
Anhui province.    These areas are connected by an express-way which goes from Shanghai 
along the Yangtze River to Nanjing, the capital city of Jiangsu, crosses the river from south 
to north at this city, and goes west up to and beyond Hefei, the capital city of Anhui.  
Sample enterprises were selected randomly from the enterprise lists compiled by local 
governments of 28 counties selected randomly from the 53 counties.  The garment and 
casting samples consist of 78 and 80 enterprises, respectively.       
We chose specific industries for case studies, partly because the productivity impacts 
of privatization cannot be assessed unless we can reasonably assume identical production 
function parameters among sample enterprises.    We chose the Great Yangtze River Region, 
                                                                                                                                                         
the TVE sector in the light industries whereas the opposite was the case in the heavy industries.   5 
because the influence of SOEs in Shanghai, a center of the state industrial sectors in China, 
tends to decline with the distance from Shanghai, so that sufficient geographical variations 
of the influence of SOEs can be observed.  The garment and the casting industries were 
chosen, partly because they have numerous enterprises over wide areas and partly because 
their dependence on SOEs is contrasting: the metal casting enterprises wholly depend on 
SOEs in both input and output transactions as of 2000, whereas the garment enterprises are 
far more independent from SOEs. 
The retrospective survey of enterprises provides information on production and costs 
as well as changing distributions of ownership shares during the 1995-1998 period, and 
information on equipment and marketing channels in 1995 and 1998.  Table 1 shows the 
growth rate of real value added of the sample enterprises and the number of observations 
by area.    In this study, value added was calculated as gross value of output minus material 
cost, energy cost, and payments to shipping agencies and wholesalers.  We applied the 
method of double deflation to the survey data of nominal value added, in order to obtain 
real value added at the 1998 price.
5  The data of real value added in both 1995 and 1998 
are complete only for 56 enterprises in the garment industry and 58 in the casting industry, 
                                                  
5  The price indexes of products of the Garment and Other Fiber Products industry and the Smetling and 
Pressing of Ferrous Metals industry, assessed at the factory gate by the State Statistics Bureau (various 
years), were used as deflators for garment and casting products, respectively.    Since price data on 
shipping and marketing services are not available, we applied the same deflator as the output to these 
services.    As deflators for materials in the garment and the casting industries, we used the factory price 
index of products of the Textile industry and the Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals industry, 
respectively.    As a deflator for energy cost, we used the electricity price data in the case of the garment 
sample and the coal price data in the case of the casting sample, both of which are provided by the State 
Statistics Bureau (various years).   6 
particularly because of the entry of new enterprises after 1995.
6  For descriptive 
exposition, we classified the study areas into four regions: the suburb of Shanghai, 
Southeast Jiangsu, Southwest Jiangsu, and Anhui.     
Southeast Jiangsu is a traditionally fertile granary and close to Shanghai.    With these 
geographical advantages, the economy in this area started growing rapidly with the 
remarkable development of TVREs, as soon as the central government commenced the 
economic reform in the late 1970s.  By the early 1990s, the successful TVRE-led 
development strategy pursued in this area became widely known under the name of the 
“Sunan Model of Industrial Development.”  Since the early 1990s, however, the Sunan 
Model has been challenged by another model of industrial development formed in and 
around Wenzhou city in Zehjiang province, whose economy has been catching up with 
Southeast Jiangsu starting from a much lower level of development (Zhang 1999; Tang and 
Cheng 2000; Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka 2002b).  In this “Wenzhou Model of Industrial 
Development,” high economic growth is driven by private enterprises and “disguised” 
TVREs which were essentially private but disguising themselves as TVREs because private 
enterprises were unfavorably treated by various regulations.     
TVREs were also developed in Southwest Jiangsu including Nanjing.  Probably 
because Nanjing is the capital city of Jiangsu province, there were a larger number of SOEs 
                                                  
6  Each sample includes several new entrants established in 1995, 1996, or 1997.    Those firms 
established in 1998 were excluded from the sample.    The production data in the first year of operation 
of new entrants were not used in the analysis because variables in the first year have incomparably   7 
and urban collective enterprises in this area than in Southeast Jiangsu.  Accordingly, the 
relative importance of the TVRE sector was smaller in this area than in Southeast Jiangsu.   
In Anhui, where manufacturing was least developed among the study areas, the share of the 
SOE sector in gross industrial output was greatest, although the absolute size of the SOE 
sector was much smaller than in the other study areas.
7  It is interesting to note that the 
share of private enterprises and self-employed small-scale family enterprises in Anhui 
province was greater than in the other study areas in 1995 and earlier.
8  This  is  consistent 
with the hypothesis that the development of the private sector was predominant in poor 
areas with a few SOEs because local governments in such areas could not afford to 
establish a large number of TVREs in cooperation with SOEs.     
As shown in Table 1, the average size of enterprises, in terms of their real value added, 
grew in all areas in the garment sample but declined in Shanghai and Southwest Jiangsu in 
the casting sample from 1995 to 1998.
9  A factor that made the casting industry stagnant 
or declining was the anti-pollution regulation in urbanized areas.    The regulation was most 
stringent in Shanghai, where the municipality government prohibited the expansion and 
renewal of foundries.    Customers shifted orders away from foundries in Shanghai to other 
areas where environmental regulations were less tight, especially to Southeast Jiangsu.  
                                                                                                                                                         
greater variances than those in subsequent years. 
7 Data of industrial output and its composition by sector, aggregated at the provincial level, are available 
from the Statistical Bureaus of Jigansu and Anhui provinces (various years). 
8  The self-employed enterprises are those with seven workers or less. 
9  In a discussion of growth performance, attention should be paid to effects of business cycle.   8 
As a result, casting enterprises in Southeast Jiangsu had much better growth record than 
their counterparts in Southwest Jiangsu as well as Shanghai.    Casting enterprises in Anhui, 
however, were growing even faster.  In the garment sample, the average growth rate 
increases with distance from Shanghai.  Thus, in both casting and garment samples, 
enterprises in Anhui were growing faster than in any other study areas.  These 
comparisons suggest that patterns of comparative advantage in the coastal and central 
regions were significantly changing within labor-intensive industries, such as the garment 
industry, and polluting industries, such as the casting industry. 
A unique feature of our enterprise survey is that it traces the changing distribution of 
ownership within each sample enterprise since its establishment.  Officially registered 
ownership types (such as TVRE, shareholding, joint share, foreign joint venture, and 
private) could be misleading as the episodes of numerous “disguised” TVREs in Wenzhou 
suggest.  Such enterprises also existed in Jiangsu, according to our own survey.  
Moreover, such categorization offers no information on increases in private ownership 
shares if the registered ownership type of the enterprise remains the same.  Thus, for the 
purpose of measuring the extent of privatization, it is more desirable to use continuous 
indicators of ownership than categorical variables.  In practice, the privatization of an 
enterprise begins by estimating the capitalized value of its assets.  Then, the shares of 
various owners (e.g., township government, which primarily invested at the time of 
enterprise establishment, and enterprise itself, which reinvested profits) are determined   9 
according to their previous investments and services, and hence, ownership distribution 
becomes clear after capitalization.  To trace the ownership distribution before the 
capitalization, we simply relied on the subjective assessment of key informants, who were 
usually general managers.   
As shown in Table 2, we classified owners into five types: (i) local government, (ii) 
SOEs, (iii) workers, (iv) joint ventures with foreign enterprises, and (v) private owners.  
In this classification, SOEs include urban collective enterprises.  Private owners include, 
most importantly, the general manager and other leaders within the enterprise, and a 
relatively small number of individuals and enterprises outside the enterprise except SOEs 
and joint ventures.  In the garment sample, there were a number of enterprises that had 
experienced partial privatization before 1995, as reflected in private ownership of as high 
as 23.6 percent.    In the casting sample, most enterprises were 100 percent owned in 1995 
by the local government at least nominally, and there were a small number of completely 
private enterprises, most of which were outgrowths of self-employed, family enterprises.  
Thus, the average ownership share of local governments was much higher in the casting 
sample in 1995.  In both samples, however, the pace of privatization accelerated, and the 
average ownership share of local governments decreased to less than 30 percent and that of 
private owners increased to more than 50 percent in 1998.    Presumably, this is not a mere 
coincidence but a result of the increasing pressure that the central government put on local 
governments to fully privatize their TVREs enterprises.   10
In the literature on ambiguous property rights in China, a central question is why 
TVREs could achieve remarkable growth performances in the 1980s and the early 1990s, 
despite the disincentive effect of the ambiguous ownership of TVREs on enterprise 
management.    A plausible answer to this question is that the market in this period in China 
was characterized by high transaction costs, which could be reduced by the intervention of 
local governments (Li 1996; Hsiao et al. 1998; Jin and Qian 1998; Chen and Rozelle 1999).   
Although not mentioned in this literature, we would like to emphasize that such transaction 
costs were particularly high when transactions were made with SOEs.  As free market 
transactions developed, however, it is likely that the government support for transactions 
and cooperation between TVREs and SOEs have gradually lost its significance.   If this is 
the case, privatization ought to increase the production efficiency of rural enterprises.  In 
order to examine the relevance of these arguments, we will look at the production data 
more carefully in the next two sections.   
 
III.    Privatization and Growth in the Garment Industry 
Garment enterprises in our sample produce a variety of garment products ranging 
from cheap underwear to expensive and technically difficult men’s suits.  In view of the 
presumed importance of marketing channels, we classify these products into original 
products, which are designed and marketed by the sample enterprises themselves, and those 
produced under subcontracting with large enterprises, such as SOEs and foreign joint   11
ventures.  Although many of the sample enterprises in Southeast Jiangsue used to be 
cooperative TVEs or branch factories of SOEs in Shanghai when free market transactions 
were not developed, they are now transacting with a number of SOEs and other enterprises.   
While subcontracting has several forms, such as putting out and original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM), we do not distinguish them since such distinction is practically 
impossible for some sample enterprises.  Instead, we distinguish subcontracting with 
SOEs from subcontracting with other types of enterprises. 
Table 3 shows the composition of original products and subcontracting with SOEs and 
other enterprises in sales revenues by study area in 1995 and 1998.  It is said that 
compared with Zhejiang province, garment enterprises in our study areas, especially those 
in Southeast Jiangsu, have high skills and use expensive equipment to produce high-quality 
products, but they are behind in establishing their own marketing network.  Consistent 
with this argument, the proportion of original products to the sales revenue in Southeast 
Jiangsu in 1995 is as low as 18.0 percent and that of subcontracting with SOEs is as high as 
45.6 percent.  A possible explanation for such differences between this area and Zhejiang 
is that garment enterprises in Southeast Jiangsu could afford to invest in expensive 
machines by taking advantage of geographical proximity to Shanghai to receive 
subcontracting orders from SOEs and foreign ventures.  Although garment enterprises in 
Anhui were not advantageous in these respects, they have high shares of subcontracting 
with SOEs because they tended to follow the Sunan Model, in that they had a high   12
propensity to subcontract with relatively small local SOEs and urban collectives.     
Table 4 compares the ownership share of the local government between those 
enterprises heavily dependent on SOE-subcontracting and the other  sample  enterprises.  In 
1995, SOE-subcontracting accounted for more than half of the sales revenue at 24 sample 
enterprises, which had a much higher average ownership share of the local government and 
a lower average share of private owners than the other sample enterprises.  This suggests 
that the local government’s involvement in enterprise management was helpful in making 
and maintaining subcontracting contacts with SOEs in 1995.  By 1998, however, there 
was a reversal in the relationship between ownership pattern and transaction mode, in 
which those enterprises heavily dependent on SOE subcontracting tended to have lower 
government shares and higher private shares.  This reversal is consistent with our 
maintained hypothesis that the local government’s supports for subcontracting with SOEs 
lost its significance in this industry during the period under study.     
Privatization, which clarifies ambiguous property rights by increasing managers’ 
ownership shares, would enhance profit-seeking incentives of managers.  If the local 
government’s support for subcontracting with SOEs became no longer important, 
privatization would improve production efficiency without sacrificing transaction 
efficiencies.  To date, however, few empirical studies have assessed the productivity 
effects of TVRE privatization or confirmed even its existence.  On the contrary, some 
theoretical studies presume that productive efficiency of a rural enterprise does not depend   13
on the type of enterprise’s ownership (e.g., Weitzman and Xu 1994).    An exception is the 
pioneering work by Li and Rozelle (2000), who find that although positive productivity 
effect exists, it is realized not right after privatization but with adjustment lags of a few 
years.
10   
To assess the productivity effect of privatization, we specified a growth function of the 
following general form: 
 
G(V)  ＝  f [G(K), G(L), PS1995, ∆ PS1996, ∆ PS1997, X],     (1) 
 
where G(V), G(K), and G(L) are growth rates of real value added, real capital stock, and the 
number of workers, respectively, during from 1995 to 1998; PS1995 is the ownership share 
of private owners in 1995, which is intended to capture the effect of privatization that took 
place before 1996; ∆ PS1996 and ∆ PS1997 are increases in the share of private owners during 
the whole year of 1996 and 1997, respectively; and X is a vector of other independent 
variables.  To estimate real capital stock, we first estimated nominal net investment from 
the survey data on nominal capital stock, and then used the factory price index of 
machinery products as deflator.
11  Estimated  real  values  of  net investments were added to 
                                                  
10  Their use of dummy variables to represent the privatization is questionable in view of the continuous 
process of privatization. 
11  Through our survey, we obtained nominal values of initial investments in equipment at the time of 
enterprise establishment, and nominal stock values of equipment in 1995 and 1998.    We assumed that 
equal amount of nominal net investment were made each year between enterprise establishment and 
1995 and between 1995 and 1998.    In this way, we estimated annual values of nominal net investment.   14
the real value of initial investment to obtain real values of capital stock in 1995 and 1998.     
Since the dependent variable in equation (1) is the growth rate of value added rather 
than physical quantity, it is affected not only by production efficiency but also by 
transaction  efficiency.  If  privatization  enhanced production efficiency without sacrificing 
transaction efficiency, it would have a significantly positive effect on output growth.  To 
the extent that the role of the local government in supporting TVE-SOE transactions was 
important, however, privatization would reduce transaction efficiency and cancel out part 
of the positive productivity effect.  We focus on the privatization that took place before 
1998 because it is unlikely that privatization in 1998 affected immediately the productivity 
growth during the 1995-1998 period.  Vector X includes the proportion of 
SOE-subcontracting to sales revenue in 1995, three provincial dummies (with Southwest 
Jiangsu being default), the road distance from Shanghai, the road distance from the nearest 
exit of the expressway, and the years of operation.  If subcontracting with SOEs helped a 
TVE learn technology, marketing, and/or management from SOEs, the proportion of 
SOE-subcontracting would have a positive effect on labor productivity growth. 
To avoid possibly serious multicollinearity between G(K) and G(L), and to control for 
the effect of enterprise specific unobservables, we modified equation (1) into the following 
estimable form:   
 
G(V/L)＝a0 + a1PS1995 + a2∆ PS1996 + a3∆ PS1997 + a4X + a5G(K/L) + u,   (2)   15
 
where u is an error term.  Since the growth rate of capital-labor ratio, G(K/L), on the 
right-hand side of equation (2) is likely to be endogenous, we instrumented it with ln(L), 
ln(K/L), and ln(V/L) in the base year (i.e., 1995) and the growth rate of average annual 
wage earnings per worker in the county during the 1995–1998 period.
12  Although  there  is 
a possibility that the choice of the extent of privatization by the local government is 
affected by the labor productivity growth of the enterprise, ∆ PS and PS are treated as 
exogenous variables at this stage of our study. 
Table 5 reports 3SLS estimates of the capital-labor ratio (K/L) growth function and 
the labor productivity (V/L) growth function.  For comparison, the OLS estimates of the 
reduced form are also shown.  In column (i), the K-L ratio level in 1995 has a negative 
and significant effect on its subsequent growth, serving as an instrumental variable.  The 
years of operation have a positive and significant effect on the K-L ratio growth, which 
suggests that older enterprises tended to have had large labor employment before 1995 and 
then hasten to adjust their labor and capital inputs to the soaring wage rate during the study 
period.  The private ownership share as of 1995 and the subsequent privatization do not 
have any significant effect on the K-L ratio growth in the garment sample. 
In columns (ii) and (iii), privatization in 1996 has a positive and significant effect on 
the growth of labor productivity, which strongly supports the hypothesis that privatization 
                                                  
12  The data of average labor earnings by county were taken from the Statistical Bureaus of Shanghai   16
improves production efficiency.  In both columns, the productivity effect of privatization 
in 1997 is positive but insignificant.  These results are consistent with the finding by Li 
and Rozelle (2000) that productivity effect is realized not right after privatization but with a 
few-year adjustment time lag.    The result that the proportion of SOE-subcontracting has a 
negative and significant effect on labor productivity growth suggests that the sample 
enterprises had already absorbed technologies and management know-how from SOEs by 
the sample period, and that transactions with technologically more advanced enterprises, 
such as foreign joint ventures, and/or the establishment of own marketing channels were 
becoming important for productivity growth.  As shown in column (ii), the estimate of 
coefficient, a5, of G(K/L) in equation (2) is 0.667, which is reasonably close to the sample 
average of (1 – labor share), where the labor share is measured as the ratio of nominal wage 
payments to nominal value added.   
 
IV.    Privatization and Growth in the Casting Industry 
Unlike subcontracting in the garment industry, casting subcontracting was made 
almost exclusively with SOEs, especially those in and around Shanghai.    Even in the case 
of original products manufactured and sold freely by TVEs, major buyers were mostly 
SOEs, and suppliers of important inputs, such as coal and pig iron, were also SOEs.    Thus, 
transactions and cooperation with SOEs were indispensable for casting enterprises.  
                                                                                                                                                         
municipality and Jiangsu and Anhui provinces (various years).   17
Moreover, the quality of cast products is difficult to inspect visually, especially in the case 
of complicated shapes and large sizes, and, hence, the cost of inter-enterprise transactions 
tended to be high in this industry, even though free market transactions were developed in 
the 1990s.  It is, therefore, likely that the role of the local government in supporting 
transactions with SOEs was greater in this industry than in the garment industry. 
According to Table 6, original products accounted for a large part of sales revenue in 
Anhui but much less in areas closer to Shanghai.  Enterprise  managers  told us that original 
products tended to be parts for light consumer goods and relatively simple machines, such 
as small pumps and tractor engines, while parts for heavy equipment, such as huge engines 
for large ships, were produced under subcontracts with SOEs.    The heavy concentration of 
large SOEs in Shanghai and its vicinity seems to explain the finding from Table 6 that the 
proportion of subcontracting decreases as the distance from Shanghai increases.  As 
shown in Table 7, the ownership structure of original product-oriented enterprises was 
similar to that of subcontracting-oriented enterprises in 1995.  In 1998, the difference in 
ownership structure between these two types of enterprises was a little greater than in 1995, 
but it was not statistically significant.     
Table 8 reports the estimation results of the K-L ratio function and the labor 
productivity growth function for the casting sample.  This table is organized in the same 
fashion as Table 7 except that the proportion of SOE-subcontracting to sales revenue in 
table 7 is replaced by the proportion of original products in Table 8.  In column (i), the   18
private ownership share as of 1995 had a negative and significant effect on the growth of 
the K-L ratio during the 1995-1998 period, whereas privatization that took place in 1997 
had a positive and significant effect on the K-L ratio growth.  These results suggest that 
privatized enterprises reduced labor employment at first but then increased as production 
efficiency improved.  The Anhui dummy has a positive and significant effect on the K-L 
ratio growth, which is likely to be a reflection of the tendency to geographical growth 
convergence.  The K-L ratio, labor productivity, and labor employment size in 1995 in 
column (i), which are excluded from column (ii), have positive and significant effects on 
the subsequent growth of the K-L ratio and, hence, they serve as instrumental variables.         
The most important result shown in Table 8 is that privatization in 1996 had a positive 
and significant effect on labor productivity growth, even though the productivity effect of 
privatization was weaker in the casting industry than in the garment industry.   
Interestingly, privatization in 1997 has a negative and significant effect on labor 
productivity  growth.  These  results are consistent with our arguments that the temporarily 
detrimental effect of privatization on transaction efficiency was more substantially in the 
casting industry than in the garment industry, and that the productivity effect of 
privatization was realized with time lags.  The Anhui dummy has a positive and 
significant effect on labor productivity as well as on K-L ratio growth, which supports the 
hypothesis that the center of gravity in the casting industry was shifting from the coastal 
region, such as the suburbs of Shanghai, to the central region such as Anhui province.         19
 
V.  Concluding  Remarks 
In this case study, we found that privatization of TVREs has been rapidly taking place 
in the Greater Yangtze River Region since the middle of the 1990s.  Although this rapid 
privatization was due partly to the policy of the central government, we argued that it was 
closely related to the increasing importance of free market transactions, which made the 
intervention of local governments in the management of TVREs less productive.  Thus, 
we advanced the hypothesis that the recent privatization has improved the production 
efficiency of enterprises.  Our hypothesis is clearly supported by the three-stage 
estimation of the capital-labor ratio growth and labor productivity growth functions for 
both the garment and metal casting industries, which commonly indicates that productivity 
was significantly enhanced by privatization with a few years’ time lag.  The estimation 
results suggest that the productivity effect of privatization was greater in an industry where 
products and materials were more efficiently transacted at free markets.   
At this point, we must emphasize that in all likelihood, our analysis has identified 
mere short-run effects of privatization on productivity.  In the longer-run, privatization 
will have greater effects on productivity than estimated in this study, as free markets of 
products and materials develop.  In our observation, enormous difference still exists 
between private enterprises in Zhejiang province and the Greater Yangtze River Region.  
First, current competition among enterprises in Zhejiang province centers round the   20
production of differentiated, improved products, often with brand names, and the 
establishment of nation-wide marketing network.  In Jiangsu, however, competition 
through brand names and the establishment of own marketing network has begun late and 
taken place only among a small number of leading enterprises.  Second, closely-related 
industries tend to be clustered in Zhejiang province to enjoy the so-called “localization 
economies” arising from information externalities, the division and specialization of labor 
among enterprises, and possibly the formation of skilled labor markets (see e.g., Zhang 
1999; Tang and Cheng 2000; Sonobe and Otsuka 2002a, b).    Such industrial clusters seem 
to have been formed gradually through free market competition over the last two decades.  
In contrast, industrial clusters have been less developed in the Great Yangtze River Region 
except the Sunan area near Shanghai.  It is likely that in the longer run, the improvement 
of products and marketing capacity and the geographical concentration of industries will 
take place in the Greater Yangtze River Region as well.     
Upshot is that we have to carefully distinguish between the short-run effects of 
privatization, which would have arisen from improved management incentives, and 
longer-run effects, which would arise from investments in the development of improved 
products and the establishment of marketing system, as well as from the formation of 
industrial clusters.  Our result that the short-run incentive effect of privation is 
significantly positive strongly indicates that privatization can be a driving force leading to 
the continued improvement of productivity over long periods, so far as privatization   21
enhances market competition among enterprises across wide areas.       
   22
References 
Anhui Province Statistical Bureau.    Statistical Yearbook of Anhui (various years). 
Che, Jiahua, and Qian, Yingyi.    “Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of 
Firms.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (May 1998): 467-96. 
Chen, Hongyi, and Rozelle, Scott.  “Leaders, Managers, and the Organization of 
Township and Village Enterprises in China.”  Journal of Development Economics 
60 (December 1999): 529-57. 
Chen, Kang; Jefferson, G. H.; and Singh, Inderjit.  “Lessons from China’s Economic 
Reform.”  Journal of Comparative Economics 16 (June 1992): 201-25. 
Fudan University Economic Research Center.  The New Avenue for Enterprise Reform 
and Development: Survey Report on Horizontal Cooperation of Industrial 
Enterprises in Shanghai [Qiye Gaige yu Fazhan Xinlu: Shanghai Gongye Qiye 
Hengxiang Lianhe Diaocha Baogaoji].    Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubansha, 1988. 
Hsiao, Cheng; Nugent, Jeffrey; Perringne, Isabelle, and Qiu, Jicheng.  “Shares versus 
Residual Claimant Contracts: The Case of Chinese TVEs.”    Journal of Comparative 
Economics 26 (June 1998): 317-37. 
Jefferson, G. H.; Rawski, T. G.; and Zheng, Yuxin.  “Chinese Industrial Productivity: 
Trends, Measurement, and Recent Developments.”  Journal of Comparative 
Economics 23 (October 1996): 146-80. 
Jiangsu Province Statistical Bureau.    Statistical Yearbook of Jiangsu (various years).   23
Jin, Hehui, and Qian, Yingyi.    “Public versus Private Ownership of Firms: Evidence from 
Rural China.”    Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (August 1998): 773-808. 
Li, David D. “A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case 
of the Chinese Non-State Sector.”  Journal of Comparative Economics 23 (August 
1996): 1 – 19.   
Li, Hongbin, and Rozelle, Scott.  “Saving or Stripping Rural Industry: An Analysis of 
Privatization and Efficiency in China.” Agricultural Economics 23 (September 
2000): 241-52. 
Lin, J. Y., Cai, Fang, and Li, Zhou.  The China Miracle: Development Strategy and 
Economic Reform.    Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996. 
Lin, J. Y. and Yao, Y.  “Chinese Rurual Industrialization in the Context of the East Asian 
Miracle,” in J. Stiglitz and S. Yusuf (eds.), Rethinking the East Asian Miracle. World 
Bank and Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Liu, Deqiang, and Otsuka, Keijiro.  “Township-Village Enterprises in Garment Sector of 
China.” In Y. Hayami (ed.), Toward the Rural-Based Development of Commerce and 
Industry: Selected Experiences from East Asia.  Washington, DC: World Bank 
Institute, 1998.   
Murakami, Naoki; Liu, Deqiang; and Otsuka, Keijiro.  “Technical and Allocative 
Efficiency among Socialist Enterprises: The Case of the Garment Industry in China.”   
Journal of Comparative Economics 19 (December 1994): 410-33.   24
Murakami, Naoki; Liu, Deqiang; and Otsuka, Keijiro.  “Market Reform, Division of 
Labor, and Increasing Advantages of Small-Scale Enterprises: The Case of the 
Machine Tool Industry in China.”  Journal of Comparative Economics 23 
(December 1996): 256-77. 
Otsuka, Keijiro; Liu, Deqiang; and Murakami, Naoki.  Industrial Reform in China: Past 
Performance and Future Prospects.    Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
Shanghai Municipality Statistics Bureau. Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai (various years). 
Sonobe, Tetsushi, Hu, Dinghuan, and Otsuka, Keijiro.  “Process of Cluster Formation in 
China: A Case Study of a Garment Town.”  Journal of Development Studies 39 
(October 2002): 118-139. (a) 
Sonobe, Tetsushi, Hu, Dinghuan, and Otsuka, Keijiro.  “From Inferior to Superior 
Products: An Inquiry into the Wenzhou Model of Industrial Development in China.” 
Manuscript.  Tokyo: Foundation for Advanced Studies on International 
Development, 2002. (b) 
State Statistical Bureau. China Statistical Yearbook (various years). 
Tang, R. and Cheng, L.  “The Survey of Rural Economic Development in the South East 
Zhejiang Province” [Zhejiang Sheng Dongnan Diqu Nongcun Jingji Fazhang De 
Diaocha Yanjiu] Jingji Tizhi Gaige113 (2000): 99-103. 
Tao, Zhigang, and Zhu, Tian.  “Agency and Self-Enforcing Contracts.”  Journal of 
Comparative Economics 28 (March 2000): 80-94.   25
Weitzman, M. L., and Xu, Chenggang.  “Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as 
Vaguely Defined Cooperatives.”  Journal of Comparative Economics 18 (April 
1994): 121-45. 
Zhang, R.  The Systematic Review of Economic Transition in Zhejiang Rural Area [Zhejiang 
Nongcun Jingji Gaige Tixi Yanjiu].    Hangzhou: Zhejiang Renming Chuban She, 1999.    26
 



















Garment industry           
   Growth  rate  8.8  9.4  13.5  25.9  15.4 
   #  of  observations  8  14  18  16  56 
Casting industry           
   Growth  rate  -13.0 2.2 -3.2 7.5  1.1 
   #  of  observations  4  14  20  20  58 
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Table 2.    Changing Distribution of Ownership Shares, 1995-1998 (%) 
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Table 3. Composition of Sales Revenue, the Garment Industry, 1995 and 1998 (%) 
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Table 4. Ownership Share by Transaction Mode, 
the Garment Industry, 1995 and 1998 (%) 
 
    Enterprises with the 
proportion of SOE- 
subcontracting > 50% 
in1995 
(i) 
Enterprises with the 
proportion of SOE- 








Number of observations  24  32  56 
1995 
  Local  government’s  


















  Local  government’s  
    ownership  share 
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G(K/L)   0.667** 
(0.149)   










ln(K1995/L1995)  -0.320** 
(0.068) 
  -0.219** 
(0.078) 
ln(V1995/L1995)  -0.061 
(0.053) 
  -0.088 
(0.062) 






R-squared 0.505  0.508  0.486 
Notes: The sample size is 56.    Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
    * Significant at 5 percent, ** significant at 1 percent (one-sided test).     
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Table 6. Composition of Sales Revenue, the Casting Industry, 1995 and 1998 (%) 
 
  
Original products  Subcontract  Total 
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Table 7. Ownership Share by Transaction Mode,   
the Casting Industry, 1995 and 1998 (%) 
 
    Enterprises with the 
proportion of original 
products > 50 %   
in 1995 
(i) 
Enterprises with the 
proportion of original 








Number of observations  29  29  58 
1995 
  Local  government’s  


















  Local  government’s  
    ownership  share 
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G(K/L)   0.533* 
(0.256)   














ln(V1995/L1995)  -0.202* 
(0.091) 
  -0.224 
(0.152) 






R-squared 0.397  0.302  0.254 
Notes: The sample size is 56.    Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
    * Significant at 5 percent, ** significant at 1 percent (one-sided test).     
 